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Abstract
Recent trends in mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. food sector – food manufactur-
ers, wholesalers, and retailers – raise concerns about market power. In the presence of
market power, farmers may receive lower than competitive farm prices, and con-
sumers may pay higher than competitive retail prices. This study presents empirical
tests of market power at the national level for seven food categories: beef, pork, poul-
try, eggs, dairy, fresh fruit, and fresh vegetables. At the national level, our tests pro-
vide evidence of competitive conduct in both the sale of final food products and the
purchase of farm ingredients.
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Recent trends in mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. food sector – food manufactur-
ers, wholesalers, and retailers – raise concerns about market power. In the presence of
market power, farmers may receive lower than competitive farm prices, and consumers
may pay higher than competitive retail prices. This study presents empirical tests of
market power at the national level for seven food categories: beef, pork, poultry, eggs,
dairy, fresh fruit, and fresh vegetables. 
The procedures employed in this study account for three important features of food
markets. First, the procedures recognize that within a product category consumers pre-
fer a variety of food items. Second, the procedures account for firm diversity by recog-
nizing that different firms produce a variety of different products using different tech-
nologies. Firm and technological diversity seem to be particularly relevant to food
industries because mergers and acquisitions may be feasible only if firms and tech-
nologies are diverse. Third, the procedures recognize that structural changes in food
markets may be unpredictable. Some of the most significant impacts on food markets
may have been unpredictable. For example, it was probably difficult to predict trends
in consumer patterns following the entry of women into the labor force in the 1970’s
and 1980’s. Unpredictability of consumer behavior poses considerable risk to food
producers and can induce industrial reorganizations that spread this risk across stages
of food production. Failure to account for product diversity and uncertainty has been
shown to seriously affect tests of market power.
The empirical evidence presented in this bulletin is mostly consistent with competitive
conduct. At the national level, our tests provide evidence of competitive conduct in
both the sale of final food products and the purchase of farm ingredients. Also at the
national level, the tests suggest that food industries pay competitive prices for farm
commodities. The results do not rule out imperfectly competitive local markets, and
they cannot be used to address questions of relative market power between specific
stages of food production. Nevertheless, the broad implications of these results may be
that it is the unpredictable nature of trends in consumer demand, and not imperfect
competition, that may be responsible for observed trends in the industrialization and
concentration of the U.S. food sector. 
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This bulletin presents empirical analyses of market
structure and competition for seven major U.S. food
markets: beef, pork, poultry, eggs, dairy, fresh fruit,
and fresh vegetables. The analyses account for struc-
tural change. Our work emerges from a theory first
developed by Heiner in which consumer demand and
input supply mesh with the output supply and the input
demands of nonidentical firms. While Chavas and Cox
have recently generalized this theory, Wohlgenant
(1989) and Wohlgenant and Haidacher (WH) were the
first to extend and apply it to food markets. This bul-
letin builds on the work of WH by accounting for
structural change.  
We appeal to the economic theory found in WH and
Wohlgenant (1989, 1996) to test for market power.
However, the market data that we use to implement the
tests appear to be driven by trends. In food markets,
we hear about trends in technical change among firms
(e.g., Clark and Youngblood), about trends in the
industrial reorganization of industries (e.g., Martinez
and Reed, MacDonald and Ollinger), and about trends
in food consumption (Kinsey and Senauer). In this
study, we define structural change as trends in market
variables and account for different types of trends in
tests of market power.
Unlike approaches that define structural change by
changes in a model’s parameters (e.g., Goodwin and
Brester), our approach allows us to capture a key fea-
ture of some types of structural change: its changing
trends are unpredictable. This view allows us to
describe and to test for unpredictably changing trends
in consumer and producer behavior. It allows us to
test for market-clearing and to estimate longrun struc-
tural relationships despite such unpredictability.
Finally, it allows us to test for market power in mar-
kets that may have undergone a series of permanent
changes over time.
Our work sheds light on policy concerns associated
with trends in the industrialization of food industries
and in consumer behavior. Economic theory suggests
such trends would be linked if markets clear (Engle
and Granger). A cointegrated model links trends
across variables and, in our case, provides a market-
clearing representation.  By failing to reject competi-
tion with a cointegrated model, our results suggest that
trends in concentration and industrialization may be
efficient solutions to unpredictable trends in consumer
demand for food (Paul). 
Structural Change and Competition in
Seven U.S. Food Markets
A.J. Reed and J.S. Clark
IntroductionWohlgenant (1989) and WH introduced the agricultur-
al economics profession to a market-clearing frame-
work in which diverse firms demand farm and nonfarm
inputs to produce the product mix of a composite
industry. By relaxing the restriction of identical pro-
duction functions across firms, they account for an
industry’s heterogeneous food items. They note that
even if each firm produces its items in fixed-input pro-
portions, because proportions vary across the diverse
firms of a food industry, production of the entire
industry is variable proportions.1 The framework
equips analysts with a tool for studying market rela-
tionships that is more general than the models derived
from the traditional assumptions of fixed proportions
and identical firms. 
Market models of diverse firms generalize competitive
market relationships. In particular, they can be used to
reconcile the concept of competitive markets with the
observation that: (1) increases in consumer food prices
are not fully passed through to farmers (Wohlgenant,
1994); (2) nonfarm input prices and consumer food
prices may move in opposite directions; (3) consumers
may pay higher markups for higher priced products
(George and King); and (4) competitive food industries
may earn positive longrun rents (U.S. Department of
Agriculture, September 1996).  Market models based
on fixed-proportions production must appeal to imper-
fect competition to explain these observations
(Wohlgenant, 1999).
Tests of market power using market-level data, then,
depend on assumptions concerning the nature of
industry production. Retail-to-farm price spreads that
exceed the marginal cost of transforming farm ingre-
dients to final food products suggest market power,
but the formulas used to compute spreads depend on
the industry production function.2 Studies based on
fixed-proportions consistently reject the competitive
model (e.g., Schroeter, Schroeter and Azzam, Azzam,
Azzam and Park, and Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson),
whereas WH and Wohlgenant (1989, 1996) just as
consistently fail to reject the competitive model for
U.S. food industries.3
This section presents an overview of the theory used in
our empirical analyses. We refer readers unfamiliar
with this theory to the cited studies of WH and
Wohlgenant (1989, 1996) for a discussion that is more
complete than that presented in this section. Readers
familiar with the theory can skip to the next section. 
At the core of the WH model are a pair of quasi-
reduced-form retail and farm price equations for each
market and a system of consumer-demand relation-
ships linking the markets. Given a consumer demand
schedule, the underlying structural model consists of
two market-clearing conditions. The first states that the
sum of food supply across the firms of the industry
equals consumer demand for the industry output. The
second states that the sum of farm ingredient demand
across firms of the industry equals farm supply. The
critical feature of the WH model is that an industry’s
firms are not restricted to possessing identical produc-
tion functions. Within this general setup, WH assume
that each industry faces an infinitely elastic supply of
nonfarm inputs (exogenous nonfarm input prices), and
a less-than-infinitely elastic supply of farm ingredients
(endogenous farm prices). To simplify the model struc-
ture and isolate analysis on retail and farm prices, WH
assume the food industry for a particular market con-
sists of all the firms that manufacture, wholesale, and
retail the industry’s final food products. 
2 Retail-to-farm price spread formulas used by ERS/USDA
(Elitzak) are based on fixed-proportions production. Presumably,
formulas based on variable-proportions would yield different mag-
nitudes.
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1 Wohlgenant (1999) formally shows that if one analyzes a com-
petitive industry producing a heterogeneous mix of final consumer
goods that we treat as a single composite (e.g., beef ), the observa-
tion that retail-to-farm price spreads widen with increases in con-
sumer food prices (e.g., George and King) implies input substitu-
tion. To explain this observation with a fixed-proportions based
model for this heterogeneous industry, one must rule out the com-
petitive model.
3 These results are predicted by the theoretical results presented in
Wohlgenant (1999). 
The Economic ModelBased on this structure4 and on market clearing for
farm ingredients and food output, Wohlgenant (1989,
1996) and WH derive the quasi-reduced-form 
lnPrj = Arf
(j) lnFj + Arw
(j) lnW + Arz
(j) lnZj + erj
(1)
lnPfj = Aff
(j) lnFj + Afw
(j) lnW + Afz
(j) lnZj + efj
j = 1,...,J
in which lnPrj represents the natural logarithm (log) of
the retail price in the jth market, lnPfj is the log of the
price of the farm ingredient used to produce output of
the jth market, lnFj is the log of the supply of the farm
ingredient used to produce output of the jth market. In
this study, lnFj captures changes in domestic supply,
and excludes changes in net exports and changes in
private and government stocks of farm commodities.
lnW is a vector of logged nonfarm input prices, and
lnZj is a consumer demand shifter to be defined below.
erj and efj are model errors on the retail and farm price
equations.5 These two retail and farm price equations
are central to this bulletin. 
In this framework, consumer demand defines the mar-
ket, and the total consumer demand shift variable for
the jth market, lnZj represents the effect of all variables
that affect demand except the own-retail price for the
product. For this bulletin, lnZj is derived as follows.
Let 
ln(Qj /POP) = ejj lnPrj +e jy ln (Y/POP) 
+Sk„ j ejk lnPrk +u j
be a per capita consumer demand relationship for the
jth product in which ln(Qj/POP) is the log of per capi-
ta consumer demand for the output of the jth industry,
lnPrj is the log of the own-retail price, ln(Y/POP) is
the log of per capita disposable income, lnPrk (k„j) is
the kth retail price of a gross substitute or complement
to product category j, and uj is an error term. Hence,
the ejj is the own-retail price elasticity of consumer
demand, ejk (k„j) is a set of cross-price elasticities of
demand, and ejy is the income elasticity of demand for
the jth good. Based on this relationship, the total
demand shifter for the jth market is 
(2) lnZj = ejy ln (Y/POP) +Sk„ j ejk lnPrk + lnPOP
in which lnPOP is the log of population. lnZj does not
capture shifts in consumer demand caused by changes
in the demand for food away from home, nor does it
capture shifts caused by changes in the composition of
the population. 
The equations 1 are “quasi” reduced because they
account for market-clearing in the jth market inde-
pendent of market clearing in other markets.6 Theory
suggests four sets of expected signs on the quasi-
reduced forms. 
First, Heiner proves that for an industry of diverse
firms, an increase (decrease) in the price of an input
decreases (increases) an industry’s demand for the
input. While this result is standard for an isolated firm
and for an industry comprised of identical firms,
Heiner’s proof applies to an industry comprised of
firms with different longrun average costs. Heiner’s
proof does not describe the negative slope of the sum
of competitive firms’ input demand schedules holding
output price constant. It describes instead the slope of
industry input demand schedule as the sum of firms’
supply moves along a downward-sloping consumer
demand schedule and, output price changes.7 Braulke
showed that Heiner’s proof applies to longrun equilib-
rium in which firms enter and exit the industry. In
equations 1, Aff
(j) is the own-price flexibility of an
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4 A brief discussion of the relationship between the structural
model and the quasi-reduced form is provided in the Appendix.
The reader is referred to Wohlgenant (1989) or Wohlgenant and
Haidacher for a more complete discussion.
5 Constants and deterministic time trends are added to all of the
empirical specifications below except the system of consumer
demand relationships (Appendix). Only a constant term was added
to the consumer demand system.
6 The quasi-reduced-form equations derive from Heiner’s seminal
work and the extensions of this work by Wohlgenant (1989) and
WH. In the quasi-reduced-form representation, shifts in the mar-
ket’s demand schedule are exogenous.  
7 For any single firm, Heiner found that the simultaneous change
in the output price caused by the change in input price may trace
out a positively sloped input demand for the firm. He found this
positive relationship disappears when summing over all firms.industry’s demand for farm ingredients, and theory
suggests Aff < 0.8
Second, the industry’s longrun quantity of food supply
increases with its own-consumer food price. Heiner,
Braulke, Panzar and Willig, and WH show that even if
all input prices are exogenous to a competitive indus-
try (flat input supplies), firm diversity implies that
positive shifts in consumer demand trace an upward-
sloping longrun industry supply function. Theory
implies Arz > 0. 
Third, if firms are identical and farm ingredients are
normal factors of production, a decrease in the supply
of farm ingredients leads to a contraction of food sup-
ply and to an increase in consumer food prices. A nor-
mal factor of industry production is one in which the
industry uses more of the factor to produce more out-
put, while an inferior factor is one in which the indus-
try uses less of the input to produce more output. The
theory of diverse firms extends the neoclassical result
that an increase in farm prices leads to increases in
food prices only if farm ingredients are normal factors
of industry food production. Since we expect that the
aggregate farm ingredients specified here are normal,
we expect Arf < 0. 
Fourth, if farm ingredients are normal factors of indus-
try production and firms are diverse, positive shifts in
consumer demand lead to longrun increases in farm
prices. For that reason we expect Afz > 0. 
The theory of diverse firms does not unambiguously
sign the response of consumer food prices to changes
in nonfarm input prices. The reason is that a marketing
input may be an inferior factor of production.9 An
increase in the price of an inferior factor raises a firm’s
average costs, but reduces its marginal costs. For a
competitive industry comprised of identical firms,
higher longrun average costs drive firms from the
industry, reduce industry supply, and drive up con-
sumer prices. The results may be different if an indus-
try’s firms are diverse. 
Inframarginal firms are bestowed with firm-specific
fixed assets that earn rent in the long run. Such firms
are bestowed with firm-specific entrepreneurial capaci-
ty (Friedman) or location that provides them with a
cost advantage over marginal firms (Panzar and
Willig). One could argue that the entrepreneurial
capacity of inframarginal pork-producing firms in the
Southeast United States exceeds that of marginal pro-
ducers in the Midwest. The cost advantage of infra-
marginal firms allows them to remain in the industry
even as the longrun average cost of other firms is
above market price. It follows that even in competitive
markets, if the factor is inferior to inframarginal firms,
an increase in its prices allows inframarginal firms to
increase their supply even in the long run. The increase
places downward pressure on output price. On the
other hand, if the factor is inferior to marginal firms,
their longrun average cost rises above output price.
Marginal firms would exit the industry, thereby reduc-
ing industry supply and placing upward pressure on
the market’s average price of output. A negative sign
on an element of Arw suggests the associated factor is
inferior to industry production, and that the positive
supply response of inframarginal firms outweighs
the negative response of marginal firms10 (Panzar
and Willig). 
Theory provides a homogeneity condition. Since con-
sumer demand is homogeneous of degree zero in
retail (food) prices and income, and output supply and
input demand are homogeneous of degree zero in
farm and nonfarm input prices, the market-clearing
price equations of (equations 1) are homogeneous of
degree zero in farm and nonfarm input prices, retail
prices, and income (e.g., WH, Wohlgenant [1989],
Chavas and Cox). 
The WH framework provides a test of the competitive
model. The test is based on the notion that if a firm is
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8 Correspondingly, the retail price equation of (1) is a Heiner-type
of industry-level output supply schedule.  
9 The example given here would not hold for the special case of
only two inputs (e.g., one farm and one non-farm input). In this
two-input case both factors must be normal, and increases in the
price of either input raise the output price.
10 Because firm-level production functions are not identical, a fac-
tor of production can be normal for some firms and inferior for
others (e.g., older versus modern plants). Hence, a factor is normal
(inferior) for an industry if the industry uses more (less) of the fac-
tor as it increases output. The weighted sums of individual firm-
level elasticities determine whether a factor is normal or inferior
(WH).a price taker in both its purchase of inputs and its
sales of output its profit function exists, and the sym-
metric second derivatives of its profit function define
reciprocal relationships between a firm’s output sup-
ply and input demands. Wohlgenant and WH derive an
analogous symmetry condition for the group of
diverse industry firms. Denoting Sf
(j)as the cost share
of farm ingredients for the jth industry, and to the
coefficients in equations 1, WH show that symmetry
at the industry level implies
Arf
(j) =  -Sf
(j) Afz
(j).
This condition states that if firms take farm and con-
sumer prices as given, there exists a symmetric
response of consumer and farm-level prices. 
When studying retail and farm price relationships,
analysts are often interested in the elasticity of trans-
mission of farm prices to retail food prices. The elas-
ticity of price transmission is the percent change in a
retail food price induced by a 1-percent change in the
farm price (George and King). Estimates of this elas-
ticity reduce to the farm share if the food industry is
competitive and if industry production exhibits con-
stant returns with respect to farm ingredients. The
assumption of fixed-proportions production (at the
industry level) imposes constant returns with respect
to all inputs, and therefore ensures transmission elas-
ticities equal to the farm share.  The WH model
allows us to test whether the elasticity of price trans-
mission equals the farm share within a variable-pro-
portions framework.  
Wohlgenant and WH show that in terms of the coeffi-
cients of equations 1, the jth industry’s production dis-
plays constant returns with respect to the farm input if   
Arz
(j) =  -Arf
(j)
Afz
(j) =  -Aff
(j)
hold. Constant returns for an industry imply zero
industry profits in the long run. If both the symmetry
and the constant returns restrictions hold, the elasticity
of price transmission equals the farm share. 
The model provides refutable hypotheses concerning
oligopsony power. Policymakers often express con-
cern that food producers exert market power when
acquiring raw agricultural commodities from farmers.
Some point out that captive supplies associated with
new marketing arrangements may have changed the
market structure so as to favor food producers and
keep farm prices below competitive levels (U.S.
Department of Agriculture, February 1996). Others
counter that such voluntary arrangements may reflect
the response to risk in a competitive market (Paul).
The WH framework provides a test of the null that
food producers acquire farm commodities competi-
tively in national markets.
The test recognizes that if firms exert market power in
acquiring farm commodities, a gap would exist
between the farm price and the industry’s demand for
farm ingredients. Shifters on the farm supply function
would define this gap.
At the level of the firm, the arguments are as follows.
Let Pfj = Pfj (Fj, Sj) denote the inverse supply function
for farm commodities facing the jth food industry,
where Sj denotes a vector of shifters to this supply
function. The first-order condition for profit maximiza-
tion of a food-producing firm takes the form MVP =
Pfj + lf (MPfj /MF), where MVP is the marginal value
product or firm-level demand for the farm commodity,
and l is a market power parameter. l embodies the
firm’s conjecture about the effect its purchases of farm
ingredients will have on the market (Bresnahan, p.
102-104). Note that the term (MPf /MF) in the above
relationship is a function of Sj. When l „ 0, the market
level demand shifters, Sj, enter the firm’s optimization
rule and define a gap between the market’s farm price
and the value of the marginal product for a competitive
firm. Hence, when l „ 0, the marginal farm price – the
firm’s MVP – lies above the average farm price and
firms restrict their demand for farm commodities. If l
= 0, price-taking firms recognize that their purchases
impart no effect on the market, the farm price (or the
value of the marginal product) equals the MVP as the
industry level demand shifters (Sj,) do not enter firms’
optimization conditions. 
For a group of nonidentical firms of an industry, the
arguments are similar. By eliminating Fj from equa-
tions 1, the two equations reduce to 
(3)  Prj = Bf
(j) Pfj + Bw
(j) W + Bz
(j) Zj + vr.
Equation 3 is an industry-level relationship similar to
the first-order conditions of a price-taking firm. Under
the null of no oligopsony power, the vector of supply
shifters, Sj, does not appear in equation 3. Under the
alternative, Sj explains the gap and  
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(j) Pfj + Bw
(j) W + Bz
(j) Zj + Bs
(j)¢ Sj + vr
suggests the industry exerts oligopsony power in
acquiring farm inputs. Equations 3 and 4 suggest that
if industry j acquires farm commodities competitively,
Bs
(j)¢ = 0. 
This concludes the review of the theory used to inter-
pret the empirical results presented in the remainder
of this report. Before we present these empirical
results, however, we review the way in which struc-
tural change enters our empirical analyses.  
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tions of 1 derive from market-clearing conditions for
consumer food products and for farm ingredients (see
Appendix). However, questions concerning the specifi-
cation of equations 1 arise if markets have undergone
structural change.
Regardless of the impact of structural change, market
clearing means that excess supply (demand) would be
of short duration and would equal zero on average.
Furthermore, the effects of unforeseen shocks to mar-
ket clearing would die out over time. In time series jar-
gon, excess supply (demand) would be stationary. It is
straightforward to show (using the market-clearing
conditions shown in the Appendix) that the error
terms, erj and efj , of equations 1 may represent excess
supply (demand) variables for food and farm products.
Stationary error terms imply market clearing, and mar-
ket clearing would prevent the variables of equations 1
from moving too far apart. 
Associated with structural change are market trends.
Evidence of trends or changes in trends of market vari-
ables are often used as indicators of structural change.
In time series jargon, variables that are characterized
or generated by trends are non-stationary. However,
even if each of the variables of equations 1 displays
trends, the equations would still reflect market clearing
if the excess supply variables or error terms are sta-
tionary. If each of the time series variables used in a
model displays trends, and if model errors are station-
ary, the model is cointegrated (Engle and Granger).
Tests of cointegration are tests of whether the data sup-
port the theory. In a cointegrated regression, some
mechanism cancels or aligns the trends among the
variables, and in equations 1 the mechanism is market
clearing. 
If the trends driving the non-stationary variables of
equations 1 are not linked, excess supply would not
die out, and the regression would be spurious (Granger
and Newbold, p. 202-214, Hamilton p. 557-562). If the
price equations of (1) are spurious, inter-temporal
movements in one set of variables of equations 1 do
not explain inter-temporal movements in other vari-
ables. A finding of a spurious regression would not
support the theory.
In general, if market variables are driven by trends, the
trends can be deterministic, stochastic, or a combination
of both. A deterministic trend is a time trend defined in
the usual way. Trends in demographics or predictable
increases in real wages and productivity over the last
century may drive the deterministic portion of trends in
market variables. Market variables generated by deter-
ministic trends pose few problems for statistical infer-
ence because with an infinite number of observations,
such variables can be forecast from past observations
with an arbitrary degree of accuracy. The second type of
trend is a stochastic trend. Variables driven by stochas-
tic trends are referred to as unit root or integrated
series. For example, trends in real wages tied to unpre-
dictable changes in the direction of inflation, unpre-
dictable changes in the direction of consumer demand,
technology, or the continual process of industrial reor-
ganization, may be generating stochastic trends in mar-
ket variables.11 Unlike deterministic trends, stochastic
trends change direction unpredictably. Integrated market
variables pose special problems for statistical inference
because even in infinite samples, optimal forecasts of
these variables do not converge, but are continually
revised as new observations become available. 
More formally, the accuracy and reliability of forecasts
of market variables depend on whether the variable is
driven by a deterministic or a stochastic trend. As the
forecast horizon grows, the forecast of a series generat-
ed by a deterministic trend converges to a time trend,
and the mean squared error (MSE) of this forecast con-
verges to the unconditional variance of the series
(Hamilton, p. 438-42). Population, real wages, and real
disposable income may be accurately and reliably fore-
cast. On the other hand, tastes and preferences, technol-
ogy, and the continual reorganization of an industry
may be stochastic trends because changes in any of
these may be impossible to predict. Unlike determinis-
tically trending variables, the forecast of a unit root
variable diverges with the length of the forecast hori-
zon, and the MSE of the forecast increases without
bound (Hamilton, p. 438-42). 
Associated with each type of trend is a type of cointe-
gration. A model constructed from deterministically
trending variable series is deterministically cointe-
grated if the deterministic trends in the model’s vari-
ables are linked. In practice, a regression model is
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11 That is, a series that is stationary around a deterministic trend.
Structural Change, Cointegration, and Market Clearingdeterministically cointegrated if a time trend variable
appended to the model is not statistically different
from zero. A model constructed from a set of sto-
chastically trending series is stochastically cointe-
grated if the model errors are stationary. Just as mar-
ket variables may reflect both a deterministic and a
stochastic trend, a model may be both deterministi-
cally and stochastically cointegrated.
Using annual time series from 1958-97, we computed
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron t-tests for the logged
and deflated variables used in the seven sets of retail
and farm price equations.12 Both sets of tests are
designed to refute the hypothesis that, conditioned on
an AR(1) representation, a single unit root net of an
intercept (or drift) or net of a deterministic time trend
governs the series. The tests differ in the way they
handle serial correlation of the error terms of the
AR(1) specification.13 Almost without exception, the
two sets of tests suggest that both a stochastic and a
deterministic trend drive most of the variable series
used in equations 1.14
Given evidence of trends in the variables, the question
is whether these equations are stochastically and deter-
ministically cointegrated. The specification of equa-
tions 1 used throughout this report is as follows. The
deterministic regressors include an intercept and a
deterministic time trend. The stochastic regressors
include a vector of (logged) nonfarm input prices (ln
W), a (log) farm supply variable specific to market i
(ln Qi), and the total demand shifters (ln Zi) for each of
the consumer demand equations.15 The vector ln W
consists of (logs of) wages, the price of packaging, the
price of transportation, and the price of energy. To sat-
isfy homogeneity, all prices and income variables in
equations 1 and 2 are deflated by the price of other
nonfarm inputs (Elitzak). Hence, the tests for cointe-
gration are based on a specification that includes six
stochastic regressors, a constant, and a deterministic
time trend for each retail and farm price equation. We
compute two sets of tests.16
The first is based on model residuals, and specifically
tests the null hypothesis of a spurious regression.
Again, a model is spurious (or not stochastically coin-
tegrated) if the model errors follow a unit process.
Engle and Granger (1987) suggest applying Dickey-
Fuller tests to model residuals. Phillips and Ouliaris
confirm that the Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron sta-
tistics can be used to test for spurious regressions. They
find, however, that the critical values depend not on the
number of observations, but on the number of stochas-
tic regressors used in model specification, and whether
the regression includes an intercept or a deterministic
time trend. 
Table 1 reports Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron t-
tests designed to refute the null that the equations 1 are
spurious regressions. The statistics are based on
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) residuals. The Dickey-
Fuller results presented in table 1 fail to reject the null
of a spurious regression for each of the 14 equations,
while the Phillips-Perron results fail to reject the null
for 8 of the 14 equations. 
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12 The sample series used to create the variables are discussed in
the Appendix. All price and income variables are deflated by the
price of other nonfarm inputs and logged prior to testing. The total
demand shifters are computed directly from the estimates of the
double-log level system of consumer demand equations. Prices and
income are also deflated by the price of other nonfarm inputs prior
to estimation. The test results were computed using Shazam.
13 Dickey and Fuller control for the serial correlation in the error
terms by adding lags to the AR(1) representation. Phillips and
Perron compute estimates of the covariogram of the errors of an
AR(1) process. For a concise comparison between the tests we
refer the reader to Hamilton (p. 504-518). The simulations present-
ed in Phillips and Perron (1988) reveal that neither test is univer-
sally more powerful than the other. 
14 The Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron results are available upon
request. Some results conflict. For example, the results suggest the
farm prices for poultry and eggs may be stationary around a time
trend (-3.95 and -4.49) but are unit root non-stationary around an
intercept. The results also suggest the farm supply for beef may be
stationary around a constant but non-stationary around a time
trend. When unit root tests conflict, Holden and Perman spell out a
multi-step procedure that may be useful in sorting out the results.
15 The seven-equation demand system was also found to be sto-
chastically cointegrated, and seemingly unrelated canonical cointe-
grating regression estimates with an intercept and no time trend
and symmetry and homogeneity imposed are used to construct the
demand shift variables used in equations 1. 
16 Because we found that a linear deterministic time trend variable
was invariably statistically different from zero, we reject the null
of deterministic cointegration for each price equation and included
it in the model specifications for each industry. Hence, our tests of
cointegration are tests specifically for stochastic cointegration. The second set of tests is designed to examine the null
that the regressions are stochastically cointegrated. The
tests are based on the observation by Park (1990) that
appending a set of integrated series to a stochastically
cointegrated model yields a spurious regression. If the
additional variables add no explanatory power to the
regression, they are superfluous, and the original
model specification is cointegrated. The technical
problem of testing whether the variables are superflu-
ous is that, in general, the model error terms are corre-
lated with the first differences of the model’s regres-
sors. This correlation destroys the asymptotic normali-
ty of parameter estimates, and hence destroys the relia-
bility of the usual chi-square tests. Park (1990) derives
a transformation that accounts for this correlation, and
uses it to transform each of the variables of a model.
Chi-square tests based on the transformed regression
represent valid tests of the null that the additional vari-
ables are superfluous, and the original model is sto-
chastically cointegrated. 
To employ the test, however, one is faced with choos-
ing a set of integrated and potentially superfluous vari-
ables to append to the model. Here, theory provides no
clear guide. Hence, we follow Park’s suggestion by
appending higher order polynomials of deterministic
time trends to the retail and farm price equations. 
Table 2 reports chi-square estimates associated with
Park’s J1 test (1990) of the null that the coefficients of
the polynomial time trend terms (T2,T 3 & T4) are
jointly zero (see table 2 for the specification of the
polynomial terms). The p-values (in parentheses) sug-
gest that at the 0.05 level of rejection, all equations are
stochastically cointegrated except the retail price equa-
tion for poultry and the farm price equations for beef,
poultry, and dairy. 
The results in tables 1 and 2 provide somewhat mixed
results. The Dickey-Fuller tests (table 2) suggest each
of the 14 equations is spurious. The Phillips-Perron
tests suggest that, at reasonable levels of rejection, 8 of
the 14 price equations are cointegrated. Finally, Park’s
J1 test suggests that, at reasonable levels of rejection,
10 of the 14 equations are cointegrated. In combina-
tion, the Phillips-Perron and Park’s test results suggest
that only the retail price equation for poultry and the
farm price equation for beef and veal may be spurious.
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Beef and veal -3.61  (1) -5.73** (1)
Pork -3.18  (3) -5.74** (3)
Poultry -4.65  (0) -4.44 (1)
Eggs -3.94  (4) -3.80 (1)
Dairy -4.84  (1) -7.52** (1)
Fresh fruit -4.20  (0) -4.12 (1)
Fresh vegetables -4.22  (2) -4.55 (2)
Farm prices (ln Pf)
Beef and veal -3.18  (0) -3.15 (1)
Pork -3.41  (0) -3.49 (1)
Poultry -3.41  (1) -5.21* 1)
Eggs -3.15  (1) -4.99 (1)
Dairy -3.72  (1) -6.00** (1)
Fresh fruit -4.02  (0) -3.92 (1)
Fresh vegetables -3.82  (1) -5.23* (1)
Values are t-tests associated with the coefficient of the lagged OLS
residuals in which the regression includes a constant and a time
trend. Values in parentheses indicate the number of lagged-first dif-
ferences in the autoregression (Dickey-Fuller) or the number of lags
included in the error covariogram (Phillips-Perron). 
*Reject the null of a spurious regression at (approximately) the 0.10
level. The result is based on a critical value of approximately -5.2.
which is -0.5 plus -4.7. -4.7 is the critical value computed by Phillips
and Ouliaris for a demeaned (constant) and detrended (one deter-
ministic time trend) regression with five stochastic regressors
(Phillips and Ouliaris, Table IIc). -0.5 is the increment associated
with adding the sixth stochastic regressor (Ng).  
**Reject the null of a spurious regression at (approximately) the
0.05 level. The result is based on a critical value of approximately 
-5.5 which is -0.5 plus -5.0. -5.0 is the critical value associated with
a demeaned and detrended regression with five stochastic regressors
and -0.5 is the increment associated with the sixth regressor (Ng).
Table 2  Variable-addition tests of cointegration
Industry Retail price equations Farm price equations










Fresh fruit 1.28 6.83
(.73) (.08)
Fresh vegetables 0.31 2.92
(.96) (.40)
Entries are c2 with the restriction a1=a2=a3=0 in the general regres-
sion P=Xb b b b + f(a,T) + e in which f(a,T) = 1T2 + a2T3 + a3T4 and in
which T = t/max(t) where P is either the logged and deflated retail or
farm price, X includes the intercept, the linear time trend, and the
six logged and deflated stochastic regressors. The values in paren-
theses are p-values, and represent the size of the rejection region
associated with the restriction. For example, values greater than
0.05 fail to reject the null of stochastic cointegration at the 0.05 level
of rejection. In the previous section, we argued that trends in mar-
ket data reflect structural change, and found evidence
of both deterministic and stochastic trends in key vari-
ables associated with seven U.S. markets. In addition,
we found evidence that markets distribute these trends
across consumers and food producers. Despite the
claim that food markets may have undergone a
sequence of permanent changes over time, we show in
this section that market-clearing provides mostly stable
longrun retail and farm price relationships.
The stochastic trends embedded in the variables of
equations 1 require us to deviate from textbook estima-
tion procedures. As stated above, such procedures fail
to account for a non-zero correlation (at any lag)
between the first difference of an explanatory variable
(i.e., the fundamental error terms of the variables) and
a cointegrated model’s stationary error terms. This cor-
relation is present in all but the simplest class of coin-
tegrated models. While it does not destroy the consis-
tency of parameter estimates, the correlation does
destroy the asymptotic normality of the estimates and
renders textbook formulas for the c2, F, and t tests
invalid for inference. 
Park (1990, 1992) and Park and Ogaki transform vari-
ables of cointegrated regressions based on this correla-
tion. Their transformations reduce general, cointegrat-
ed regressions to the simple (or canonical) class of
cointegrated regressions in which first differences of
explanatory variables are not correlated with regres-
sion errors. The procedure is to first transform the vari-
ables of a cointegrated regression and then to apply
textbook procedures to the transformed regressions.
The canonical cointegrating regression (CCR) estima-
tor applies OLS to a transformed single equation (Park
1990). We used the CCR estimator in the previous sec-
tion to compute Park’s variable addition test of the null
of cointegration (Park 1992). In this section we again
use the CCR estimator to compute a variable addition
test of oligopsony power. In addition, we apply the
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimator to a
transformed, seven-equation consumer demand sys-
tem, and to the cointegrated quasi-reduced-form retail
and farm price equations (i.e., equations 1) for each
industry. This two-step estimator, termed the seeming-
ly unrelated canonical cointegrating regression estima-
tor (SUCCR), provides us with unbiased estimates of
market structure and asymptotically-correct inference
on tests of market power and constant returns in multi-
ple equation systems (Park and Ogaki). We refer inter-
ested readers to Park, and to Park and Ogaki for details
on the transformations that we use to compute the esti-
mates presented in this section. 
Consumer Demand 
Kinsey and Senauer argue that changing trends in
consumer behavior lead to a changing structure of the
food sector. Cointegrated, market-clearing relation-
ships would reflect the transmission of trends from
consumers. To capture trends in consumer demand,
we specify and estimate a consumer demand system
for the seven industries. In this section, we discuss
the specification of the seven-equation consumer
demand system.  
Appendix table 1 presents point estimates and t-values
of the seven-equation system of composite per-capita
demand. To construct the empirical consumer demand
model, we used logged data on per-capita consumer
disappearance as proxies for the seven dependent per
capita consumption variables, and deflated all prices
and income (explanatory variables) by the price of
other nonfarm inputs (to ensure homogeneity of the
market-clearing conditions). Based on Dickey-Fuller
and Phillips-Perron tests, we could not refute the null
that virtually all of the logged variables of the con-
sumer demand system are unit root non-stationary
around a deterministic trend. In addition, we found
evidence that the individual consumer demand equa-
tions are cointegrated. Next, we imposed the symmetry
and homogeneity restrictions (e.g., Deaton and
Muellbauer, p. 43-46; Silberberg, p. 250-253) at the
mean of the sample, and report the restricted point
estimates in appendix table 1. The restricted estimates
were then used to construct the demand shifters, ln Zj,
for each industry j (equation 2), and to compute full
reduced-form price responses reported below.17
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Further Empirical Results
17 We are aware of the problem with incorporating the adding-up
condition on this double-log specification (Deaton and Muellbauer,
p. 17), and are aware of the conceptual problem of using farm-
level disappearance data as the dependent variable of the system
(WH).  Our purpose here is to compute only approximate values of
the shifters on consumer demand.  Tests of Competition and Constant Returns 
Table 3 reports the c2 and p-values associated with
symmetry, constant returns or zero profits for the
industry, and the joint restrictions of symmetry and
constant returns for the seven industries. Failure to
refute symmetry suggests food firms take both output
and farm ingredient prices as given. Failure to reject
constant returns for the industry suggests that free
entry and exit of diverse firms result in zero longrun
profits. Failure to refute the joint hypotheses of sym-
metry and constant returns suggests that, in the long
run, a 1-percent increase in the price of a farm com-
modity results in an increase in the price of a compos-
ite food category by a percentage equal to the cost
share of the farm commodity used in producing the
food category. 
The symmetry (only) and constant returns (only) test
results provide evidence of longrun competition. In
particular, the symmetry test fails to refute (at the 0.05
level) the longrun competitive model for the beef,
dairy, eggs, fresh fruit, and fresh vegetable industries.
The constant returns test fails to refute the longrun
competitive model for poultry, fresh fruit, and fresh
vegetables. It is worth repeating that this general find-
ing of competitive markets takes into account the
many permanent changes that may have occurred in
these markets over time. 
Furthermore, our tests reject the joint restriction of
symmetry and constant returns for all industries except
fresh fruit and fresh vegetables. The results suggest
that estimates of elasticities of farm price transmission
to retail apply only to markets in which final products
undergo a minimal amount of food processing. 
The general finding of competitive markets is consis-
tent with WH and Wohlgenant’s (1989, 1994, 1996)
findings. On the one hand, we expect our findings to
be similar because the model structures and data are
very much the same.18 On the other hand we expect
differences because of the different estimation proce-
dures. While our approach exploits deterministic and
stochastic trends in market data, the cited works
remove stochastic trends through a first-difference
transformation prior to estimation. In comparing the
procedures using the same retail and farm price equa-
tions, Reed and Clark find that one fails to reject para-
metric restrictions more often using a first-difference
specification of an econometric model.19 The reason is
if the explanatory variables are integrated, a first-dif-
ference transformation removes the dominant, longrun
component of the variance of the variables. Hence, if
the variables are integrated, a first-difference filter
would inflate the variance of parameter estimates and
could reduce the likelihood of rejecting any parametric
restrictions. It is noteworthy that we reject both the
symmetry and the joint restriction of symmetry and
constant returns more often than the cited works.
Oligopsony Power
In a previous section, we reviewed the theory used to
test for oligopsony power. If food firms exert oligop-
sony power in acquiring farm ingredients, a gap would
exist between the farm price and the value of the mar-
ginal product of farm ingredients at the market level.
Shifters on the farm supply associated with the jth
market, Sj, would explain this gap. Recall from above
that under the null hypothesis of food producers taking
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Table 3  Tests of symmetry and constant returns
Symmetry Constant Symmetry and
only returns only constant returns
Beef and veal 0.4773 87.9159 97.2574
(.490) (0.00) (.000)
Pork 94.9740 34.3050 98.0828
(.000) (0.00) (.000)
Poultry 26.1533 4.0383 39.4573
(3E-7) (.133) (1E-8)
Eggs 0.0381 223.52 255.7759
(.845) (0.00) (0.00)
Dairy 0.9081 48.6256 49.1519
(.341) (0.00) (.000)
Fresh fruit 2.1428 4.7536 4.7871
(.143) (.093) (.188)
Fresh vegetables 1.7731 0.8505 6.0862
(.183) (.654) (.107)
Values are chi-square statistics. Values in parentheses are p-values,
or the size of the rejection region necessary to reject the null
hypothesis. 
18 We are aware that the model specifications for eight industries
in Wohlgenant (1989, 1994) include only a single nonfarm input
price. The model specification for beef and pork (only) used in his
1996 paper is similar to the specification used here, as it includes
the same four nonfarm input prices. Furthermore, our work uses a
different deflator to impose homogeneity.
19 The study controls for differences in the data and model 
specifications. farm prices as given, no gap exists and the retail-farm
price relationship is 
(3¢)  Prj = Bf
(j) Pfj + Bw
(j) W + Bz
(j) Zj + vr .
Under the alternative of oligopsony power, the retail-
farm price relationship is
(4¢)  Prj = Bf
(j) Pfj + Bw
(j) W + Bz
(j) Zj + Bs
(j)¢ Sj + vr .
A test of whether firms acquire farm commodities
competitively in national markets reduces to a test of
the restriction Bs
(j)¢=0. 
The usual chi-square tests of statistical significance of
the Sj variables would be reliable only if the variables
of equation 3¢ and the Sj would be stationary. Because
we found evidence that both sets of variables are inte-
grated, we proceed as follows. Under the null hypothe-
sis of price-taking, equation 3¢ is cointegrated and its
error terms are stationary, and the variables of equation
3¢ are transformed to account for the correlation
between first differences of explanatory variables and
the model error terms (Park 1990, 1992). Under the
null, the integrated (untransformed) Sj variables would
be independent of the stationary error terms of equa-
tion 3¢, and Bs
(j)¢=0. Under the alternative of oligop-
sony power, the error terms of equation 3¢ would be
integrated, and this price-taking relationship would be
spurious. In this case, the integrated Sj variables and
the integrated error terms of equation 3 would not be
independent and in general Bs
(j)¢„ „ „ „ 0. Rather than test-
ing for the statistical significance of Sj, chi-square tests
of Bs
(j)¢=0 represent a test of whether the price taking
model is cointegrated or correctly specified against the
alternative that the oligopsony power relationship is
correctly specified (Park 1992).
Table 4 reports the chi-square and p-values computed
from the transformed regressions. The results report
the statistics associated with one integrated, industry-
specific farm supply shifter (S1) and both integrated,
industry-specific farm supply shifters (S1 & S2).20 The
results are based on a specification that includes a con-
stant and a deterministic time trend. At reasonable lev-
els of rejection, we fail to reject the null that in nation-
al markets, the seven food industries acquire farm
ingredients competitively.
Longrun Industry Structure
Table 5 presents SUCCR estimates of the parameters
of equations 1 for the seven food markets. Although
they account for a negative own-price consumer
response, they are conditioned on shifters of consumer
demand (i.e., ln Z). Hence, the estimates would not
account for particular shifts in consumer demand
induced by endogenous changes in relative retail prices
among the seven composite markets. However, by con-
trolling for such shifts, the ‘quasi’ reduced-form esti-
mates of equations 1 provide information on industry
structure. Given evidence of permanent change and
cointegration presented above, the results in table 5
represent longrun estimates of industry structure. 
Theory predicts a negatively sloped, longrun industry
demand for farm ingredients. In terms of equations 1,
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Table 4  Tests of competition in acquiring farm
commodities
S1 S1 & S2














Entries are c2 values and values in parentheses are significance
levels.  The sets of supply shifters on farm supply are as follows
(see Appendix for data series definitions): Beef: S1 is steers, S1 &
S2 are steers and corn price; Pork: S1 is hog inventories, S1 & S2
are hog inventories and corn price; Poultry: S1 is the price of soy-
bean meal, S1 & S2 are the price of soybean meal and corn price;
Eggs: S1 is laying flock; Dairy: S1 is cow numbers and S1 & S2 are
cow numbers and  price of soybean meal; Fresh fruit: S1 is farm
wages; Fresh vegetables: S1 is farm wages. 
**Sample interval is 1960-97.
20 The industry-specific shift variables on farm supply are defined
in the appendix. For the test to be meaningful, the variables must
be integrated. We could not refute the claim of integrated farm
supply shifters. Furthermore, because the null hypothesis is that










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































theory predicts Aff < 0. The negative estimates of Aff
for each of the seven markets are statistically different
from zero. The estimates describe downward sloping,
industry-level demand schedules for farm ingredients. 
The theory of diverse firms in a competitive market
predicts that positive shifts in the consumer demand
function trace an upward sloping, longrun industry
supply schedule. In terms of equations 1, theory pre-
dicts Arz > 0. The estimates of Arz are positive for all
seven markets, and except for fresh fruit and fresh veg-
etables, they are statistically different from zero at rea-
sonable levels of rejection. 
The theory of competitive markets predicts that if farm
ingredients are normal factors of production, a contrac-
tion in farm supply raises consumer food prices. In
terms of equations 1, theory predicts Arf < 0. The esti-
mates of Arf are negative for each of the seven indus-
tries, and are statistically different from zero. Theory
also predicts that if farm ingredients are normal, Afz >
0. The estimates of Afz are positive for all seven mar-
kets and are statistically different from zero. Negative
estimates of Arf and positive estimates of Afz suggest
the aggregate farm ingredients are normal factors of
industry production.
The estimates presented in table 5 suggest some mar-
keting factors are inferior to a number of industries.
Negative signs on elements of Arw suggest the particu-
lar factor is inferior and that the supply response of
inframarginal firms exceeds that of marginal firms. For
example, the results suggest transportation is an inferi-
or factor for the beef and pork industries. The esti-
mates may indicate that for the U.S. pork industry,
changes in vertical coordination have allowed the
inframarginal firms in the Southeast United States to
economize on the transportation of hogs. The estimates
also suggest that labor is an inferior factor for the fresh
fruit and fresh vegetable industries.
The results presented in table 5 also point to some
nonfarm inputs that appear to be normal across indus-
tries. The positive signs on the Arw coefficients associ-
ated with the price of packaging suggest that packag-
ing is a normal factor for all seven industries. This
may reflect the notion that consumers value the conve-
nience associated with the packaging of food products,
and suggests that consumers would be willing to pay
more for packaging through higher food prices.
Furthermore, labor appears to be a normal factor of
production for four of the seven industries. 
Input Substitution
The variety of consumer products and diversity of
firms within a composite industry (e.g., fresh fruits)
provide evidence of variable-proportions at the market
level (e.g., WH, Wohlgenant [1999]). Refutation of
restrictions implied by fixed-proportions analyses pro-
vides additional evidence. 
The diversity of a composite industry’s products sug-
gests that production processes vary across firms. Meat
products, for example, vary by the amount of process-
ing. Manufacturers of processed meat products would,
for example, utilize higher proportions of nonfarm
ingredients (e.g., packaging, energy) than manufactur-
ers of fresh meat products. An increase in the price of
nonfarm inputs relative to farm inputs would, there-
fore, raise longrun average and marginal costs for
manufacturers of processed products more than for
manufacturers of fresh products.21 In terms of meat
industry supply, the quantity of manufactured products
would fall relative to fresh products. In terms of input
demand, the reduction in the supply of manufactured
products relative to fresh products means that the ratio
of nonfarm inputs to farm inputs demanded by the
industry falls in response to an increase in the relative
price of nonfarm inputs.
WH (p. 21) formally show that if firms are diverse, an
industry’s input price response can be decomposed
into a substitution and an output effect in precisely the
same manner as one could decompose the response of
a single firm with a variable proportions production
technology. Wohlgenant (1999) illustrates the pres-
ence of input substitution directly for a composite
industry producing heterogeneous final food products.
All that is required is that production functions differ
across firms. These results imply that even if each
firm in an industry produces its specific product in
fixed-input proportions, if these proportions vary
across firms, variable-proportions relationships apply
at the market level. 
Test results presented in table 6 suggest that market
data do not follow the predictions of fixed proportions.
In particular, fixed proportions at the market level
imply that the own-price elasticity of an industry’s
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21 The marginal costs could fall if nonfarm ingredients are inferior
factors of industry production. The discussion here assumes they
are normal factors.demand for farm ingredients equals the product of the
own-price elasticity of consumer demand and the
industry’s cost share of farm ingredients (e.g., George
and King). Since Aff
(j) is the inverse of the industry j’s
demand elasticity with respect to the jth farm price
(from equations 1), ejj is the own-price elasticity of
consumer demand for the jth consumer product, and
Sf
(j) is the industry’s cost share of farm ingredients, the
restriction Aff
(j) = 1/(Sf
(j)ejj ) would hold if an industry
produced its composite mix of products in fixed-fac-
tor proportions. Based on the t-values reported in
table 6, one can refute the null hypothesis of fixed
proportions at the industry level for reasonable levels
of rejection.22
Estimates of elasticities of input substitution can be
computed from model parameters (Wohlgenant 1996)
and used to measure the ease with which an industry
varies its factor proportions. Table 7 reports estimates
of Morishima elasticities of substitution (Blackorby
and Russell) between the farm and the four market-
ing inputs when (in this case) changes in the farm-to-
nonfarm price ratio are caused specifically by a
change in the farm price.23 The larger the magnitude
of the estimate, the easier it is for an industry to vary
ratios of farm and marketing inputs. Positive esti-
mates suggest the input pairs are substitutes (when
the farm price changes), and negative estimates sug-
gest they are complements. For example, the results
in table 7 suggest that as farm prices rise, labor and
packaging substitute for the farm ingredient in all
seven industries. As in Wohlgenant (1996), the esti-
mates suggest that significant substitution possibili-
ties exist in U.S. food production. 
Full-Reduced-Form Price Responses
Table 8 reports full-reduced-form estimates of percent
changes in retail and farm prices induced by a 1-per-
cent increase in the set of explanatory variables.
Unlike the quasi-reduced-form estimates (table 5), the
full-reduced-form estimates account for the effect of
endogenous shifts in consumer demand when relative
retail prices change. For example, increased wages
may increase the retail price of both beef and pork
products, but the magnitude of the responses would
differ in the markets. The results presented in table 8
capture the effect of consumer responses to changes in
relative retail prices on retail and farm prices.24
Table 7  Morishima elasticities of substitution
Industry Nonfarm inputs
Labor Packaging Transport Energy
Beef and veal 2.613 1.910 -3.084 -1.775
Pork 1.717 0.456 -1.470 -0.013
Poultry 4.356 1.146 -1.912 -1.220
Eggs 4.181 0.092 -10.45 2.807
Dairy 3.083 0.590 -2.193 -1.210
Fresh fruit 2.811 0.697 0.939 -1.227
Fresh vegetables 2.270 1.275 -0.218 -1.212
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Table 6  Tests of fixed-proportions production
Industry t-values







Values are Student t-values designed to test the restriction that the
parameter Aff equals the inverse of the demand for farm ingredients
implied by fixed proportions.  Values approximately equal to 2 (in
magnitude) would reject the null of fixed proportions at the 0.05
level. The estimates of Aff are found in table 5, and the estimates of
the standard errors are the estimates used to compute the t-values
in table 5. Point estimates of the own-price elasticities of consumer
demand and the farm share for each market are found in appendix
tables 1 and 2.
22 The results are similar to those reported by Wohlgenant (1996).
The tests are preliminary because they treat the estimate of the
own-price elasticity of consumer demand as a parameter with no
variation. A simulation procedure suggested by Ng, or a bootstrap
procedure suggested by Li and Maddala may provide a more pre-
cise test. 
23 Since Morishima elasticities of substitution are not symmetric,
an estimate of response caused by a 1-percent change in the factor
price ratio induced by a change in the nonfarm input price would
differ from the estimates reported in table 7. 
24 The full-reduced-form estimates are computed using equations
19a and 19b (Wohlgenant 1991) or equations 30a and 30b (WH).
Whereas theory provides expected signs on the coefficients of the
quasi-reduced form, it does not provide expected signs on the
parameter estimates of the full-reduced form. Technically, the rea-
son is that unlike a single consumer demand equation, a system of
consumer demand equations is not negative definite (Chavas and
Cox). This is essentially why the quasi-reduced form can provide
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changes in farm supply on retail and farm prices
across the seven markets. For example, the first panel
of table 8 suggests that increases in cattle supply
depress both retail and farm prices for pork. Hence,
increased cattle supply will lower both cattle prices
(farm-level price) and consumer-level beef prices.
Because our estimates suggest that consumers treat
beef and pork as gross substitutes (appendix table 1),
lower relative beef prices imply a reduction in con-
sumer demand for pork. Because hogs are a normal
factor of production in pork supply, hog prices (farm
level) also fall. In this particular example, it is impor-
tant to recall that estimates presented in table 8
exclude the effects of imports and exports of farm
commodities.25
The column labeled “spread” summarizes the relative
responses of retail and farm prices associated with a
1-percent increase in a particular explanatory vari-
able. In particular, the estimates, computed in this
double-log specification as the difference between the
percent change in the retail and the percent change in
the farm price, represent Gardner’s response estimates
of retail-to-farm price spreads. A positive (negative)
sign implies that the market’s retail price response
exceeds (is less than) the response of the market’s
farm price. Because the estimates account for the
response of a market’s farm price and not the retail
equivalent farm price based on variable proportions,
the “spread” estimates reported in table 8 represent
responses of spreads computed under the assumption
of fixed-factor proportions. 
Table 9 compares the own-price elasticities of con-
sumer demand with the full-reduced form, own-price
elasticity of farm demand for farm ingredients for each
market. Fixed-proportions production implies that an
industry’s input demand would be less own-price elas-
tic than the own-price elasticity of retail demand.
However, the results in table 9 suggest that for four of
the seven markets, the industry’s full-reduced-form
demand for farm ingredients is more own-price elastic
than consumer demand.26 Such results call into ques-
tion the validity of market price analyses based on
fixed proportions. 
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25 Attempts to interpret the results presented in this section are dif-
ficult because standard errors and t-tests are not computed. Such
estimates might be computed using the methods suggested in foot-
note 22.   
26 The derived demand for farm ingredients reported in table 9 is
as follows. If the full-reduced-form system (i.e., table 8) of farm
price equations is represented in matrix notation as Pf = b b b b1 F + b b b b2
X, where F is the vector of farm supplies, and X is the vector of all
other explanatory variables, the estimates in table 9 are b b b b1
-1. The
own-price elasticities of derived demand for farm ingredients
(accounting for consumer substitution) are the diagonal elements
of b b b b1
-1.
Table 9  Own-price elasticities of farm and con-
sumer demand
Own-farm price elasticity  Own-retail price
of industry demand elasticity of 
Market for farm ingredients consumer demand





Fresh fruit -1.020 -0.208
Fresh vegetables -0.753 0.054This report demonstrates that structural change can be
incorporated directly into a very general and powerful
set of market models. Early empirical findings of com-
petitive U.S. food markets based on this general theory
stood in sharp contrast to findings of market power
based on the traditional and restrictive assumptions of
fixed-factor proportions. By accounting for structural
change, we have shown that food market data closely
support this general theory and result in further evi-
dence of competitive U.S. food industries. 
In this report, we equate trends in market variables
with structural change. We found that the most intrigu-
ing type of trend is the type that changes direction
unexpectedly. Unpredictable changes in trends fit
Kinsey and Senauer’s description of structural change
in food consumption and Paul’s explanation of indus-
try reorganization. Yet, it is precisely their unpre-
dictability that poses obstacles to statistical inference.
A main motivation of this report is to provide infer-
ence on competition, and we have relied on recent
advances in econometrics to exploit such trends in
market variables and test whether seven U.S. food
industries operate competitively within an environment
of structural change.
Although market variables may be driven by unpre-
dictable changes in trends, it is necessary that models
constructed from them do not. Our finding that retail-
and farm-price relationships derived from this general
theory are cointegrated supports the theory, as well as
the claim, that changing trends in food consumption
alter the structure of food industries. It also suggests
that such models can be used to test for market power
despite the many permanent changes in U.S. food mar-
kets that may have occurred over time. 
Our finding of mostly competitive U.S. food industries
offers important explanations of why concentrated
food industries may be competitive. Paul argues that
unexpected downward trends in consumer demand
motivate firms to specialize and seek vertical arrange-
ments that serve to spread the risk of downward trends
in revenues. Our finding of cointegrated retail- and
farm-price relationships suggests that competitive
industries will reorganize to spread the risk of uncer-
tain downward trends in consumer demand. 
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Underpinning the pair of quasi-reduced-form retail and
farm price equations in the text equations 1 for each
market is a general market-clearing condition for final
industry output and a general market-clearing condi-
tion for farm ingredients. They are general because,
within the same composite industry, firms’ farm
demand and firms’ output supply will vary across
firms. Within the same industry, one firm’s production
function may be different from other firms’ production
functions. Hence, the structure of this class of models
provides an analytical framework for price analyses of
market for which any one industry produces a variety
of different final products. The comparative static
results developed by Heiner, and extended by
Wohlgenant (1989), do not depend on the restriction of
identical firms. For a more detailed discussion of this
structure, see WH or Wohlgenant (1989). 
In the particular setup in the text, a food industry con-
sists of all manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing
firms associated with a composite final demand prod-
uct (e.g., beef). Each industry faces a final, market-
level consumer demand schedule for its products and a
market-level supply schedule for the farm ingredients.
For tractability, firms in the same industry face the
same composite market prices for output and all
inputs. 
In this setup, if i denotes an index associated with a
firm in the industry, market clearing for final consumer
goods could be generally written as
Si Sr
i (Pr ,P f , W) = Dr (Pr, Z) (i)
where Sr
i is the supply of the ith firm, Pr the output
price, Pf the farm price, W a vector of non-farm input
prices, and Z is a consumer demand shifter. Condition
(i) states that the sum of firm-level supply equals final
consumer demand for the industry’s output. Market
clearing associated with farm ingredients is expressed
as
Si Df
i (Pr ,P f , W ) = F (ii)
in which F is farm supply, and Df
i is the ith firm’s
demand for farm ingredients. Condition (ii) states 
that the sum of firm-level demands for farm ingredi-
ents equals the market-level supply of farm ingredi-
ents. Equations i and ii represent a general form of 
the structural model for each market examined in 
this study. 
The structural parameters of equations i and ii define
the Ar and the Af of equations 1 in the text. The struc-
tural parameters of equations i and ii are found by
totally differentiating equations i and ii and expressing
the results in terms of partial elasticities of supply and
demand. Totally differentiating equations i and ii and
rearranging, gives
(err - e) d lnPr + erf d lnPf = ez d lnZ - erw d lnW
- efr d lnPr -  eff  d lnPf   = efw d lnW - d ln F
where err, for example, is the weighted sum of the
elasticities of firm supply, i.e., err = Si err
i (Qr
i/Qr).
Wohlgenant and WH solve the two-equation system
for d lnPr and d lnPf in terms of d lnZ, d lnW, and d
lnF and reveal the precise way in which the structural
parameters define the coefficients of the quasi-
reduced-form flexibilities (the A coefficients) in the
text. The relationship between the structural parame-
ters and the response coefficients are spelled out in the
cited articles, and define the comparative static results
discussed in the text.
Data
To the greatest extent possible, we followed the direc-
tions of Wohlgenant and Haidacher (WH) when con-
structing the economic variables used in this study. All
of the variables of equations 1-4 in the text were con-
structed from annual data from 1958 to 1997. All of
the potentially superfluous farm supply shift variables
except the laying flock (for eggs) were also construct-
ed from annual data from 1958 to 1997. The laying
flock variable was constructed from 1960-97 data. 
The retail prices are constructed from annual average
Consumer Price Index (CPI) data, U.S. City Average,
Not Seasonally Adjusted. The particular series used to
construct retail prices are:
Beef and veal Beef and Veal, CPI, U.S. City
Average, Not Seasonally Adjusted
Pork Pork, CPI, U.S. City Average, Not
Seasonally Adjusted
Poultry Poultry, CPI, U.S. City Average,
Not Seasonally Adjusted
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AppendixEggs Eggs, CPI, U.S.  City  Average, Not
Seasonally Adjusted
Dairy  Dairy and Related Products, CPI,
U.S. City Average, Not Seasonally
Adjusted  
Fresh fruit  Fresh Fruits, CPI, U.S. City
Average, Not Seasonally Adjusted
Fresh veg.  Fresh Vegetables, CPI, U.S. City
Average, Not Seasonally Adjusted
Nonfood All Items Less Food, CPI, U.S. City
Average, Not Seasonally Adjusted
Beverages Non-Alcoholic Beverages and
Beverage Material, CPI, U.S. City
Average, Not Seasonally Adjusted
Sugar Sugar and Sweets, CPI, U.S. City
Average, Not Seasonally Adjusted
Cereal Cereals and Bakery Products, U.S.
City Average, Not Seasonally
Adjusted
Farm level prices are constructed from non-seasonally
adjusted annual Producer Price Index (PPI) data for
farm products. The series used to construct farm price
variables are:
Beef and veal Slaughter Cattle, PPI, Farm
Products, Not Seasonally Adjusted
Pork Slaughter  Hogs, PPI, Farm
Products, Not Seasonally Adjusted
Poultry Slaughter  Poultry, PPI, Farm
Products, Not Seasonally Adjusted 
Eggs  Chicken Eggs, PPI, Farm Products,
Not Seasonally Adjusted
Dairy  Fluid Milk, PPI, Farm Products,
Not Seasonally Adjusted
Fresh fruit  Fresh Fruits and Melons, PPI, Farm
Products, Not Seasonally Adjusted
Fresh veg. Fresh Vegetables Except Potatoes,
PPI, Farm Products, Not Seasonally
Adjusted
The raw farm prices for beef and veal and pork (Pf*)
are adjusted (as in Wohlgenant and WH) to account for
the value of byproducts in the farm prices for slaughter
cattle and slaughter hogs. We use the 1982 levels of
the gross farm value (GFV) and the byproduct value
(BPV), and hence the net farm value (NFV = GFV -
BPV) for cattle and for hogs. These data are recorded
by USDA/ERS. Using the 1982 values, data on
byproduct allowances (Pb) for cattle and hogs are used
to adjust the raw PPI farm price series. In general, the
log of the adjusted farm price, ln Pf is computed as
ln Pf = (GFV82/ NFV82) ln Pf
* - (BPV82/ NFV82) ln Pb
In particular, the adjusted farm price formula for beef
is
ln Pf = (155.5/141.1) ln Pf
* - (14.4/ 141.1) ln Pb
and is
ln Pf = (94.3/87.0) ln Pf
* - (7.3/87.0) ln Pb
for pork.
All CPI and PPI price series were obtained from
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) web sites, and the
GFV, BPV and byproduct allowances were obtained
from ERS data sets with help from Lawrence Duewer. 
The price of labor, packaging, transportation, energy,
and other inputs from 1968-1997 were obtained direct-
ly from published reports (Elitzak). The series was
extended back to 1958-1967 by overlapping the 1968-
97 data set with a consistent and similar data set cover-
ing the 1958-67 period. The data were provided by
Howard Elitzak.  
The series used to construct farm supply are computed
as the product of per capita food disappearance multi-
plied by U.S. Population, including armed services
(July 1). The particular per capita disappearance data
series used are:
Beef and veal Beef plus Veal, Food Disappearance
Per Capita, Carcass Weight (lbs)
Pork Pork, Food Disappearance Per
Capita, Carcass Weight (lbs)
Poultry Total Chicken Plus Turkey, Food
Disappearance Per Capita, Carcass
Weight (lbs)
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Capita, Farm Weight (lbs)  
Dairy All Dairy Products, Food
Disappearance Commercial Sales
plus USDA donations (lbs of milk
equivalent, milkfat basis)
Fresh fruit Fresh Fruit (including melons),
Food Disappearance Per Capita,
Farm Weight (lbs) 
Fresh veg. Commercially Produced Fresh
Vegetables Excluding Potatoes and
Sweet Potatoes Minus Mushrooms,
Commercial Disappearance Per
Capita, Farm Weight (lbs) 
The farm supply variables for beef and pork were con-
verted from carcass weight to live weight by dividing
the disappearance values (in carcass weight) by the
annual average ratio of the dressed to live weight
under federal inspection. The dressed and live weight
data are reported in Annual Livestock Slaughter, the
Agricultural Statistics Board, NASS, USDA, and were
made available by Lawrence Duewer. The dependent
variables used in the estimation of the system of con-
sumer demand relationships were constructed using
the same food disappearance variables, except no
adjustment was made to convert the beef and pork dis-
appearance data to live weight. 
The data to compute shifters on consumer demand
(other than prices) are:
Population U.S. Population, including armed
services, July 1
Income Per Capita Personal Disposable
Income, Current Dollars, multiplied
by Population
The data used to form nonfarm input prices were pro-
vided by Howard Elitzak. They are:
Packaging Food Marketing Cost Index 
(1982 = 100), packaging component
Transportation Food Marketing Cost Index 
(1982 = 100), transportation component
Energy Food Marketing Cost Index, energy
component
Other Food Marketing Cost Index, advertis-
ing, communications, rent mainte-
nance and repair, business services,
supplies, property taxes, short-term
interest. This variable is used as the
deflator in this bulletin. 
Data to construct the shifters on the farm supply used
to test for oligopsony power tests are:
Beef & veal S1: Steers, 1 year and older, January 1
S2: Price of number 2 yellow corn,
Chicago 
Pork S1: U.S. hog inventory, all hogs and pigs
S2: Price of number 2 yellow corn,
Chicago  
Poultry S1: Price of soybean meal, 48 percent,
Decatur 
S2: Price of number 2 yellow corn,
Chicago
Eggs S1: Laying flock, average annual per
month
Dairy  S1: Cows and heifers on farms, 2 years
and older, January 1
S2: Price of soybean meal, 48 percent,
Decatur
Fresh fruit S1: Average hourly wages paid to
all hired farm workers
Fresh vegetables S1: Average hourly wages paid to
all hired farm workers
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Appendix table 1  System of consumer demand equations
Explanatory Per capita consumer demand equation for:
variable Beef Pork Poultry Eggs Dairy Fresh fruit Fresh vegetables
Beef -0.065 0.574 -0.333 0.191 0.089 -0.621 -0.481
price (-1.02) (15.3) (-3.20) (5.08) (2.37) (-6.5) (-7.3)
Pork 0.322 -0.745 -0.085 0.030 0.069 -0.083 -0.152
price (15.0) (-20.0) (-1.2) (.91) (2.23) (-1.3) (-3.04)
Poultry -0.078 0.029 0.607 0.091 0.112 0.335 0.207
price (-3.0) (-.95) (-6.0) (2.60) (3.36) (5.02) (3.70)
Egg 0.045 0.012 0.083 -0.064 0.030 -0.101 0.014
price (4.70) (.79) (2.31) (-2.18) (1.50) (-2.90) (.37)
Dairy 0.053 0.085 0.303 0.084 -0.974 -0.140 -0.035
price (1.87) (2.06) (3.01) (1.45) (-14.5) (-1.52) (-0.37)
Fresh fruit  0.148 -0.033 0.327 -0.089 -0.039 -0.208 0.135
price (-6.51) (-1.24) (4.90) (-2.77) (-1.37) (-2.50) (2.63)
Fresh vegetable 0.093 -0.050 0.157 0.015  -0.004 0.113 0.054
price (-7.22) (-2.89) (3.59) (.51) (-.17) (2.66) (.81)
Nonfood 0.210 0.139 -1.170 0.388 0.905 -0.008 -0.466
price (1.93) (2.00) (-6.67) (5.5) (13.8) (-.052) (-4.08)
Beverage -0.163 0.164 0.093 0.012 0.110 0.202 0.057
price (-3.74) (6.37) (1.36) (.47) (4.78) (3.12) (1.32)
Sugar 0.410 -0.367 -0.701 -0.195 -0.101 -0.455 -0.253
price (4.51) (-6.50) (-4.48) (-3.3) (-1.9) (-3.0) (-2.53)
Cereal -0.668 0.353 0.967 -0.129 0.235 0.801 0.564
price (-4.56) (3.57) (3.53) (-1.2) (2.51) (2.92) (3.19)
Income/ 0.175 -0.103 0.965 -0.335 -0.430 0.145 0.357
pop. (5.33) (-3.23) (12.2) (-9.0) (-13.8) (2.10) (5.66)
Intercept 1.005 -0.321 6.291 2.797 5.406 5.010 5.344
(14.0) (-4.51) (36.9) (34.3) (79.5) (33.0) (38.7)
Entries are elasticity estimates with symmetry and homogeneity imposed at the sample means. Values in parentheses are t-values. The 
shares of income used to impose the symmetry restriction at the point estimates are as follows: 0.316 (beef and veal), 0.0180 (pork), 
0.008 (poultry), 0.0082 (eggs), 0.0241 (dairy), 0.0075 (fresh fruit), and 0.0062 (fresh vegetables).
Appendix table 2  Factor shares for the seven industries
Industry Labor Packaging Transport Energy Other Farm
Beef & veal 0.1892 0.0731 0.0430 0.0215 0.1032 0.5700
Pork 0.2904 0.1122 0.0660 0.0330 0.1584 0.3400
Poultry 0.2156 0.0833 0.0490 0.0245 0.1176 0.5100
Eggs 0.1628 0.0629 0.0370 0.0185 0.0888 0.6300
Dairy 0.2244 0.0867 0.0510 0.0255 0.1224 0.4900
Fresh fruit 0.2948 0.1139 0.0670 0.0335 0.1608 0.3300
Fresh vegetables 0.2904 0.1122 0.0660 0.0330 0.1584 0.3400
Estimates of Consumer Demand and Factor SharesUnited States Department of Agriculture
Economic Research Service
1800 M Street, NW
Washington, DC  20036-5831